Protecting Without Infringing: The Psychology of Security

Brock Henry

Hanover College

Independent Study

Winter 2006
Abstract
This study was designed to examine two psychological factors that influence how people decide if a potentially invasive law is protecting them or if it is encroaching on their civil liberties, specifically as relates to an invasion of privacy. Participants ($N = 58$, 69% female) completed Death Anxiety, Attack Likelihood, Value of Security, and Liberalism scales. Participants who exhibited greater death anxiety/mortality salience also exhibited significantly greater value of security ($p = 0.044$). Additionally, participants who exhibited greater political conservatism also exhibited significantly greater value of security ($p = 0.009$). These findings imply that political decision-making is partially based on an irrational fear of death, and that people are at least marginally vulnerable to being politically manipulated unknowingly.
Protecting Without Infringing: The Psychology of Security

One of the basic tensions between citizens and their government is the tension between security and privacy. Human beings have an inherent need to feel secure from harm by the world around them (Maslow, 1963). However, we also have a desire to maintain a certain level of privacy. The Declaration of Independence suggests that people are entitled to the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Are these just arbitrary rights that the founding fathers pulled out of thin air? Certainly not. In fact, the Declaration describes these rights as “unalienable”. The founding fathers felt that all humans, regardless of station in life, are entitled to these rights.

What is liberty, though? One definition of liberty is “freedom from unjust or undue governmental control” (American Heritage Dictionary, 2002). The Puritans left England to establish America because they felt that their government was exerting undue and unjust control over them in certain areas of life. If our country was founded on principles of liberty, it seems reasonable that citizens should expect to be granted that liberty.

One specific application of this definition of liberty is privacy. There are certain matters that a government need not regulate, or even maintain records of. For example, the kind of automobile a person drives, where he or she chooses to send their children to college, and what type of movies a person watches are all matters that have no relevance to the government of a free, liberty-based society. It is hard to imagine being able to live a quiet and peaceable life if the government were to be constantly looking over one’s shoulder, keeping records of every move that a person makes.
In the United States, the concept of a Big Brother government is not one that is highly regarded. A liberty-based society carries with it the assumption that its citizens are capable of responsibly directing their own lives, without the need for governmental intervention at every step of the way. A government with free and unrestricted access to all types of personal records would hardly coincide with this assumption.

Security vs. Privacy

In his article entitled “The Political Ideal of Privacy,” the theorist H.J. McCloskey suggests that people tend to strongly oppose policies of censorship, restricted phone tapping, bugging of homes and of offices, unwarranted searches, compulsory questionnaires by the government, etc. He proposes that this is true because people believe that privacy is not just a desirable privilege, it is a right. In other words, it is not merely a luxury, it is something that is owed to a person.

McCloskey later mentions that, in the International Covenant of Human Rights, Article 17, the U.N. states that “No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his reputation or honour.” (McCloskey, 1971). This adds tremendous credence to McCloskey’s argument, given that at the writing of his article, there were already 150+ nations in the U.N. Therefore, this resolution is not based on the radical political assertions of a few powerful world leaders. Rather, it is a resolution agreed upon by the majority of the world’s population. That being the case, a citizen of a country such as the United States, a country which proclaims itself to offer a liberty-based society, can reasonably expect the government to abstain from intruding in certain areas of his or her life.
Unfortunately, though, governments must sometimes increase their involvement in citizens’ lives in order to protect them. In a world where crime and even terrorism are no longer rarities, governments must constantly determine optimal ways to protect their citizens from these unlawful acts. Often, this means citizens must sacrifice some of their privacy in order for the government to better know how it can protect them.

McCloskey (1971) readily concedes that there are certain times when citizens’ privacy may be overridden, and he cites national emergency as one such time. He immediately follows that concession, though, by reminding his reader that it is common understanding that there must be necessary and compelling reasons for breaching this line of privacy, given that privacy is indeed a right to which people are entitled to under normal circumstances. The line of reasoning is that if the rights of the individual place the group’s wellbeing in jeopardy, the group takes precedence. The implicit conclusion to this argument, though, is that once the group’s wellbeing has been restored, the rights of the individual should also be restored.

Although a loss of privacy is not unquestionably inherent in an increase in security, the two often go hand-in-hand. In order for a government to bring a criminal to justice, the government must know where to find the criminal. In order for the government to know the criminal’s whereabouts, the government must monitor the criminal’s activity. This can involve close monitoring of activities that governments like that of the United States would not typically monitor. A broad-spectrum monitoring program involving many citizens is not necessary in this scenario, though; only the criminal need be monitored.
Sometimes, though, a government does not know exactly who the criminal is. In this case, the government must extend the scope of observation to not only trace the whereabouts of the criminal, but to decipher who the criminal is. A broad-spectrum monitoring program may be necessary in this case. In order to pinpoint who the criminal is, the government must monitor a large number of citizens to detect abnormal behavior in one citizen. Once the criminal is known, the government can then scale its monitoring program back down to focus only on the criminal.

Thus, the concept here is a sacrifice of privacy by individuals in exchange for the group’s security. Although this implies the assumption that the good of the group is greater than the rights of the individual, most would agree to this, at least on a theoretical level, because they recognize themselves as part of the group. Although detriment to the individual does not necessarily imply detriment to the group, detriment to the group does necessarily imply detriment to the individual.

So the question one must ponder is where the line should be drawn between security and invasion of privacy. How invasive should governments be allowed to act in the name of national security? Does that line depend on the circumstance or is it written in stone? In recent years, events such as the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act and President Bush’s admittance to engaging in domestic spying have brought these types of questions to the forefront of many Americans’ minds. Given their newfound relevance, these questions need to be seriously considered.

*The Issue at Hand*

While one person may feel that a law is simply doing its job to look after the safety and well-being of American citizens, another person may feel that his or her
privacy is violated by the law. It is the goal of this inquiry to investigate some of the psychological factors that play into one person viewing a law as just, and maybe even necessary, while another feels that the law is unjust due to a compromise of personal rights. Many factors are relevant, but this study seeks to discover the role of mortality salience and political conservatism in people’s opinions of laws.

*Mortality Salience*

According to Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Greenberg (2003), *mortality salience* is simply thinking about one’s own death. These three men have been working for nearly two decades on developing a theory they call “Terror Management Theory (TMT),” of which mortality salience is the key factor studied.

Since TMT’s development, many factors have been correlated with mortality salience. Among these factors are worldview-related nationalistic constructs (Arndt et al., 2002), dissonance theory (Jonas et al., 2003), presidential support (Landau et al., 2004), body mass index (Goldenberg et al., 2005), legal decision-making (Arndt et al., 2005), desire for offspring (Wisman et al., 2005), etc.

Klass (2005) summarizes TMT by suggesting that when a person is forced to confront a threat to her life, thus eliciting a fear of death, she reacts with defensive mechanisms for the purpose of returning to a “homeostatic sense of calm”. In other words, there is an ideal state of calmness that a person prefers to stay in. When an event disrupts that, especially one that elicits a fear of death, the person engages in actions that are meant to counteract the disruptions, bringing them back to that calm state. For example, these defensive mechanisms often involve retrieving cultural standards or religious beliefs that one has held onto for lengthy periods of time. Going back to the
safety of those closely held beliefs, ones that often comfortingly address the subject of death, assuages the fear of death that the person has just been confronted with.

Although, to-date, no research has been done correlating mortality salience and security vs. privacy, there are some intuitive predictions that one can make. If a person’s preferred state is a homeostatic calm (where fear of death is not present), then the threat of harm through crime and/or terrorism would disrupt this calm, propelling one into a “fear of death” state. In order to remedy the situation, the person will try to counteract the threats with defensive mechanisms.

Imagine, then, that a bill has just been announced to the public and is to be promptly voted on by lawmakers. The law’s purpose is to reduce a terrorist threat. Supporting this law then can serve as the defensive mechanism whereby the person is able to return himself or herself to the homeostatic calm.

Intuitively, it seems reasonable to think that the greater the terrorist threat, the greater the trouble a person would go to to counteract the threat. It is possible that the bill being introduced for legislation requires some privacy sacrifices by the citizens in order for the increased governmental protection to be made possible. If this is the case, within most citizens’ minds would be a threshold. This inner threshold would regulate how great a threat must be in order for the person to feel comfortable sacrificing privacy in the name of security. Once that threshold has been crossed, he or she would not only be willing for the bill to be passed, but would be in favor of it.

This study then seeks to measure the degree to which there is a correlation between a person’s mortality salience and the relative value of security and privacy.

*Political Conservatism*
According to Jost and colleagues (2003), the investigation into what drives people to either political conservatism or political liberalism began at least five decades ago. They suggest that the first study to isolate political conservatives for consideration was Adorno and colleagues’ classic research on the authoritarian personality in 1950.

In their meta-analysis, Jost et al. (2003) detail that many researchers over the years have suggested different cognitive styles, motivation needs, and ideological beliefs that are at the heart of a person’s stance on the conservative-liberal continuum. After reviewing both the classical and contemporary research done on the topic, Jost and his fellow researchers (2003) arrived at an interesting conclusion: that people may move toward political conservatism partially as a way to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty.

This then allows us to make some hypotheses regarding the correlation of political conservatism and security vs. privacy. According to Jost et al. (2003), a person will, at least partially, hold to politically conservative views as a means of alleviating fear, anxieties, and uncertainties. If Jost et al. (2003) are right in this hypothesis, and our hypothesis that fear of death and the value of security are positively correlated, then political conservatism and the value of security should also be positively correlated. In other words, the more politically conservative a person is, the more she is theoretically trying to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty. The more the person is trying to reduce these three factors, the more likely she will be to embrace laws that reduce them, despite the fact that the laws may necessitate a sacrifice of privacy.

This study also then seeks to confirm this hypothesis that political conservatism and the value of security are positively correlated.

*Implications*
The implications stemming from research in the tug-of-war between security and privacy promise to have significance in how both lawmakers and citizens view the lawmaking process. Information on the way citizens respond to certain laws, and the reasons for those reactions, can better educate lawmakers on what type of policies are seen as acceptable to what groups of citizens. If fear of death does in fact prompt one to be more willing to trade privacy for security, policy-makers could use this to their benefit. For example, if a policy-maker felt motivated to promote a security bill, he could potentially focus on the tragic effects of not passing the bill, thus increasing people’s fear of death.

Consider John Ashcroft’s (2003) comments as he toured the country promoting the USA PATRIOT Act. Notice his use of the innocuous, and rather ambiguous, phrase “opened opportunities for information sharing.” He said, “Almost two years after Americans fought in the skies over Shanksville, we know that communication works. The Patriot Act opened opportunities for information sharing. To abandon this tool would disconnect the dots, risk American lives and liberty, and reject September 11th’s lessons.” While some find the PATRIOT Act overtly invasive, others, such as Ashcroft, tout it as something not only beneficial, but indispensable.

Just as lawmakers can use the findings of this study to their advantage, citizens can also use them to detect when policy-makers use emotional propaganda rather than sound logic to garner support for their laws.

Hypotheses and Method

If participants tend to think about their own mortality, then they will also favor stringent security measures that require sacrifices of privacy. In other words, they will
favor security over privacy. In addition, if participants are politically conservative, they will favor security over liberty. Participants will be given a questionnaire to measure their fear of death, value of security at the expense of privacy, political conservatism, and general demographic information.

Methods

Participants

The initial sample set for the study included 96 participants. Due to incomplete data, 38 participants were completely excluded from data analysis. The remaining 58 participants ranged in age from 18-65 years, and were 69% (40 participants) female. The set contained 54 Caucasians, 2 Hispanics, 1 Middle Easterner, and 1 Caucasian/Hispanic. In addition, 12 reported themselves as Republican, 10 as Democrat, 4 as Independent, and 2 as Green. Thirty participants indicated no party affiliation. Participants were obtained by placing the questionnaire on the Internet (at http://www.brockhenry.com). The survey was open to any person who is a U.S. citizen and at least eighteen years of age.

Materials

The first scale on the questionnaire was a 20-item scale, which we later denoted as the “Death Anxiety Scale”. This scale was developed by the researchers of this study. Each item contained a 1-6 Likert scale, with “1” indicating “Not at all true of me” and “6” indicating “Very true of me”. Two sample items from the scale are (for complete scale, see Appendix A):

1) “I think about my own death often.”
2) “I often worry about my loved ones dying.”

The second scale on the questionnaire was a 4-item scale, which we later denoted as the “Attack Likelihood Scale”. This scale was developed by the researchers of this study. Each of the 4 items was an event involving terrorist activity, and participants were instructed to indicate, in percentages, the likelihood of each event. Two sample items from the scale are (for complete scale, see Appendix B):

1) “A terrorist attack on U.S. soil in the next 5 years.”
2) “You will be killed by a terrorist attack in the next 5 years.”

The third scale on the questionnaire was a 15-item scale, which we later denoted as the “Value of Security Scale”. This scale was also developed by the researchers of this study. Each of the 15 items was a provision that has been proposed by the U.S. government at some point in the past. The provisions are not all from the same law, and their presence in the scale was not suggestive that they have or have not been passed into law. Participants were instructed as follows: “Below is a list of security measures that governments have made or have proposed making in response to national security threats. We are interested in when you believe these measures are necessary. What would the probability of attack need to be for you to support the following security measures? Assume that, if the attack were to happen, it would be on U.S. soil in the next 5 years and would result in the deaths of over 100 civilians.” Participants were then asked to indicate the probability, in percentages, next to each provision. Two sample items from the scale are (for complete scale, see Appendix C):
1) “Government monitoring of all phone conversations.”

2) “Immunity from prosecution for internet service providers, phone companies, landlords, etc. who agree to allow governmental wiretaps or physical searches.”

The final scale on the questionnaire was a 2-item scale, which we later denoted the “Liberalism Scale”. These questions were developed by the researchers of this study. The first question was an open-ended question asking participants to indicate the political party (if any) that they belonged to. The second question asked participants to indicate how conservative or liberal they would describe themselves. Responses were on a 1-6 Likert scale, where “1” indicated “Very Conservative” and “6” indicated “Very Liberal”.

The final portion of the questionnaire consisted of three open-ended demographic questions: age, sex, and ethnicity.

*Procedure*

Participants were directed to a study home page on the Internet (the page could be found at http://www.brockhenry.com). They were first asked to read through an informed consent page, which contained information stating that the purpose of the study was “to examine the psychological factors that play into a person’s decision to support or oppose governmental security measures”. In addition, the informed consent page stated that participants must be U.S. citizens and at least eighteen years of age. Before proceeding, they were asked to acknowledge that they met these two conditions.
Upon confirming their age and citizenship, each participant was then directed to the questionnaire page. The entire questionnaire was contained on one page. Participants were not asked to redirect their browsers to any other location throughout the duration of the survey. The survey contained the Death Anxiety Scale, the Attack Likelihood Scale, the Value of Security Scale, the Liberalism Scale, and the demographic questions.

After completing the questionnaire, which was estimated on the Informed Consent page to take approximately 10-20 minutes to complete, the participants were asked to click a button that said “Submit Survey”. Upon doing so, participants were then redirected to a Debriefing page.

The Debriefing page indicated that the study’s purpose was to investigate correlations between participants’ mortality salience, political conservatism, and their support or opposition to governmental measures. Participants were then asked to keep the study confidential, so as not to compromise the results. Finally, participants were directed to Brock Henry’s email address if they wished to see the results at the conclusion of the study.

Results

Scoring

The scores obtained from the Death Anxiety Scale were used to create a “death anxiety” score. There were 20 items in the scale, and those that were stated in the negative were reverse scored, so as to control for an acquiescence bias. The average of all scores in the scale, including the reverse-scored items, was computed for each participant in order to create the “death anxiety” variable. Reliability of the scale was good, with a Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.81. A high “death anxiety” score indicates a high fear of
death or mortality salience for a given participant. Therefore, a low “death anxiety” scale indicates a low mortality salience or fear of death.

The scores obtained from the Value of Security Scale were used to create a “security” score. There were originally 15 items in the scale, but 8 were removed to increase reliability. The 7 remaining items had a Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.92. A high “security” score indicates a participant is willing to forego privacy in the pursuit of security. Thus, the lower a participant’s “security” score is, the less likely she is willing to give up privacy in order to obtain security.

The “liberalism” variable was calculated using the raw scores from the question “How conservative or liberal would you describe yourself as being?” Higher scores indicate greater liberalism and lower scores indicate greater conservatism.

No average scores were obtained from the Attack Likelihood Scale.

*Removed Data*

There were 96 participants total. Thirty-eight participants were removed, though, because of incomplete data. That left a data sample drawing from 58 participants.

*Expectations*

It was expected that participants who tend to think about their own death will also tend to value stringent security measures that involve reductions in privacy. In other words, it was expected that participants who have higher “death anxiety” scores will also have higher “security” scores.

It was also expected that the more politically liberal a participant is, the less he or she will value stringent security measures that involve reductions in privacy. In other
words, it was expected that participants who have higher “liberalism” scores will have lower “security” scores.

Correlation Between Death Anxiety and Value of Security

In order to establish whether or not there is a relationship between mortality salience/death anxiety and value of security, a correlational analysis was done between the “death anxiety” variable and the “security” variable.

There was indeed a significant correlation between the two variables, such that $r = 0.265, p = 0.044$. This reveals that the participants with a higher degree of death anxiety do actually value security at the expense of privacy. This was consistent with the hypothesis. Refer to Figure 1 to see this correlation.

Figure 1. Effect of death anxiety on value of security.

Note. The correlation between “Death Anxiety” and “Security” was statistically significant, such that $r = 0.265, p = 0.044$. 
In order to ensure that the correlation between Death Anxiety and Value of Security is a direct one, a partial correlational analysis was done. Fear of death by a terrorist attack was controlled for, and the resulting correlation between “death anxiety” and “security” was $r = 0.280, p = 0.035$. This indicates that participants’ value of security is directly correlated to their general fear of death and not to a specific fear of death by terrorist attack.

**Correlation Between Liberalism and Value of Security.**

Finally, in order to establish whether or not there is a relationship between political liberalism and value of security, a correlational analysis was done between the “liberalism” variable and the “security” variable.

There was a significant correlation between these two variables as well, such that $r = -0.365, p = 0.009$. This indicates that the participants who are more politically liberal tend to value privacy over security. In other words, the more politically liberal a participant is, the less likely she is to give up her privacy in the pursuit of security.

**Discussion**

At the beginning of the study, it was hypothesized that the greater the mortality salience is for a person, the more he or she will value security at the expense of privacy. In other words, the more anxious a person is about his or her death, the more likely that person is to sacrifice his or her privacy in the pursuit of obtaining security. In addition, it was hypothesized that the more politically liberal a person is, the less he or she will value security at the expense of privacy. In other words, the more politically liberal a person is,
the less likely that person is to sacrifice his or her privacy in the pursuit of obtaining security. Both of these hypotheses were supported by the study.

**Implications**

If it is indeed true, as this study seems to indicate, that there is a correlation between a person’s level of death anxiety and their value of security, there are some interesting political implications. To reiterate what this positive correlation means, the more a person dwells on their mortality or fears their death, the more likely he or she is to feel comfortable sacrificing privacy in order to gain security or protection.

Consider the fact that “mortality salience” (MS), a concept closely associated with Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Pyszczynski et al., 2003), essentially addresses an irrational fear of death. The fear of death that mortality salience involves is one that is a general fear of death. It does not stem from the fear of a specific type of death, and it does not stem from the fear of dying at a particular time. It is simply a general fear of death. Since it lacks a connection to anything concrete, it is therefore also irrational.

In contrast, a fear of death by terrorist attack is rational, assuming that there is actually a high likelihood of terroristic activity occurring. Who would not be afraid if they were informed that they were about to be killed by a terrorist? This specific situation-oriented fear stands in stark contrast to MS fear, because it is a logical response.

Although one’s value of security could be discussed in varied contexts, the trade-off between security and privacy discussed here is one that solely focuses on the connection with one’s government. The first, and most basic, implication of this study stems from this focus on laws and provisions. If a person’s fear of death is positively
correlated with their value of security, which is tied in with their political decision-making on laws, then that person is at least partially basing their political decisions on their fear. Since this is MS fear, the person’s political decisions are being partially based on an irrational fear of death. This is interesting, considering that most people would say their political decisions are based on a conscious, rational weighing of evidence, both for and against, a given proposed law.

Taking a step beyond this implication brings us to an even more sobering consideration. Landau et al. (2004) studied the effect of reminders of death and 9/11 on support for President Bush. They found that reminding people of their death tends to cause people to cling to the protection that is afforded them by their political leaders.

In addition, they found that both reminders of death and reminders of 9/11 positively affect people’s approval of President Bush. This finding was specific to Bush, as they noted that MS seemed negatively correlated with approval of other politicians, such as John Kerry.

In hypothesizing why this is true, Landau and his colleagues suggested that this is at least partly due to the fact that President Bush is undeniably focused on passing anti-terrorism laws. In other words, he is fond of laws that stress security.

Thus, Landau et al. (2004) are suggesting the same thing that this study has suggested: the more you remind someone of her death, the more likely she will favor laws that offer protection (even at the expense of privacy). In addition, the more likely she will value a leader who is able to offer that protection.

The implication that stems from all of this is that a politician who is aware of these correlations, could use them as a method of manipulating a group of citizens. Use
Bush as an example. If he knows that reminders of death and 9/11 are positively correlated with greater support for him, and he knows that death anxiety is positively correlated with his approval rating (because he tends to pass laws that offer security), he could use this information to raise his approval rating. Theoretically, all Bush would need to do to cause a hike in his approval rating is to remind people of their death. The more urgent he made the situation appear, the more death anxiety would rise, and thus, the more his approval rating would rise.

This is sobering, because it suggests that politicians like Bush, who are known for pushing strong security laws, can greatly affect their standing with constituents by reminding them of their mortality. This gives the impression that politicians have much more subtle influences on us than most would like to think about.

Future Directions

This study opens the door to a great deal of future research possibilities. The most intriguing ones are those that would seek to provide greater evidence for the implications just discussed. If politicians do indeed have the ability to raise and lower their approval ratings by simply reminding citizens of their deaths, then those citizens can be influenced for political gain without their knowledge. Further investigation must be done, though, before one could ever legitimately suggest this.

More investigation into the implications of one’s willingness to sacrifice privacy would also be intriguing. It seems that this also offers some possibilities for political manipulation.

In general, this study needs to be both continued and replicated to further justify the conclusions drawn here.
Limitations

Although the correlations discussed were found to be statistically significant, it remains to be seen whether or not they hold true for a large population. This is true because the sample size was so small. Although the sample size was relatively diverse, it was not large enough to justify generalization. Increasing the breadth of the data sample would significantly add to this study’s generalizability.

Conclusion

Mortality is inherent in humanity. Every person will die someday. Some people tend to fear death more than others, though. Reminding people of their death seems to have interesting effects on the rest of their lives. Insofar as political decision-making goes, this study has suggested that one’s level of fear regarding death plays at least a small role. This conclusion is compelling because it flies in the face of what the average person would consciously suggest is driving their political decision-making processes. If fear of death and politics really are connected, a crafty politician could certainly use that information to his or her advantage.
References


Appendix A

The following is the Death Anxiety Scale in its entirety, as it was written and used by the authors of this study. The instructions are included.

Each item was followed by a 1-6 Likert Scale, with responses indicating the following:

1: “Not at all true of me”
2: “Not completely true of me”
3: “Not very true of me”
4: “Somewhat true of me”
5: “Mostly true of me”
6: “Very true of me”

Instructions: “Please use the scale below to respond to the following statements.”

Items:

1. “I think about my own death often.”
2. “I often worry about my loved ones dying.”
3. “If a person will die soon and is in great pain, doctors should be allowed to end his or her life painlessly.”
4. “I seldom worry about my own death.”
5. “I have had a close friend or relative die.”
6. “I often think about the fact that I will die someday.”
7. “I often worry about being in a fatal accident.”
8. “I am confident I know what will happen to me after I die.”


10. “I avoid conversations regarding death.”

11. “If a loved one were brain dead, I would accept the decision to take him or her off of life support.”

12. “I avoid films with themes that involve death.”

13. “I often think about the fact that someday I will no longer be alive.”


15. “I avoid going to funerals.”

16. “A close friend or relative of mine has died in the last 12 months.”

17. “I think death is a natural part of life.”

18. “Doctors should use every means to prolong a person’s life, even if the person is in a vegetative state.”

19. “If I were brain dead, I would still want to be kept alive by life support technologies.”

20. “I am comfortable about what I believe will happen to me after I die.”
Appendix B

The following is the Attack Likelihood Scale in its entirety, as it was written and used by the authors of this study. The instructions are included.

Instructions: “Please estimate the likelihood (in percentages) of the following events.”

Items:

1. “A terrorist attack on U.S. soil in the next 5 years.”
2. “A terrorist attack on U.S. soil in the next 5 years resulting in over 100 deaths.”
3. “Someone you know will be killed by a terrorist attack in the next 5 years.”
4. “You will be killed by a terrorist attack in the next 5 years.”
Appendix C

The following is the Value of Security Scale in its entirety, as it was written and used by the authors of this study. The instructions are included.

Instructions: “Below is a list of security measures that governments have made or have proposed making in response to national security threats. We are interested in when you believe these measures are necessary. What would the probability of attack need to be for you to support the following security measures? Assume that, if the attack were to happen, it would be on U.S. soil in the next 5 years and would result in the deaths of over 100 civilians.”

Items:

1. “Government monitoring of all phone conversations.”
2. “Government monitoring of all banks transactions.”
3. “Government monitoring of all library records.”
4. “Government monitoring of all internet activities.”
5. “Government monitoring of all email activities.”
6. “Government monitoring of all voice mail messages.”
7. “Ability of a court to issue a search warrant for any area in the United States.”
8. “Ability to execute a search warrant without notifying the person being investigated.”
9. “Ability to subpoena any tangible items (books, papers, records, documents, etc.) that are relevant to an international terrorist investigation.”
10. “Use of automated fingerprint identification at ports of entry into the United States.”

11. “Institution of a foreign student monitoring program.”

12. “Immunity from prosecution for internet service providers, phone companies, landlords, etc. who agree to allow governmental wiretaps or physical searches.”


14. “Prevention of consulate shopping (the practice of seeking out a consulate that will issue an applicant a visa when other consulates have declined to issue the visa).”

15. “Ability of the attorney general to designate any non-citizen a terrorist whom he believes is engaged in activity that poses a threat to U.S. national security. Upon designation, the individual will be immediately detained and promptly deported from the U.S.”